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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAAG-PAP (M) (8 Oct 71)

DAFD-OTT-711013

22 October 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d
Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Period 1 November 70 to
1 December 70 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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Verne L. Bowers
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 2d Brigade (Prov) (Sep)
25th Infantry Division
APO SF 96268

AVEMID

16 March 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned For The Period 1
November 1970 to 28 February 1971

See Distribution

Commanding Officer -- Colonel Joseph R. Ulatoski
Prepared by -- 18th Military History Detachment
Location -- Camp Frenzell-Jones, Republic of Vietnam
Map Reference -- Scale 1:100,000; Sheets 6330 I, II; 6331 II; 6430 I,
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1. (C) OPERATIONS: Significant Activities

The quarter from 1 August to 31 October 1970 was marked by a generally low level of activity as enemy units suffered acute supply shortages. These supply shortages were a direct result of the highly successful Cambodian operations undertaken by US and Vietnamese units in May and June of 1970. Continued emphasis was placed on upgrading ARVN/US/PF forces as units of the 25th Infantry Division emphasized combined operations with those indigenous forces and conducted extensive training programs designed to increase tactics and weapons skills. This intensive training program was conducted to insure the success of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) pacification program by providing local villages and hamlets protection against VC guerrilla activity and to pave the way for the redeployment of US troops as part of the continuing Vietnamization of the war. Keystone message directing redeployment of the 25th Infantry Division was received by the Division on 12 October 1970 and Division Operation Order 183-70 was published on 15 October 1970. The 1st and 3rd Brigades were to stand down during November while the 2nd Brigade was to remain in Vietnam operating east of Saigon in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. The 2nd Brigade was reorganized as a separate Brigade on 8 November and placed OPCON to II Field Force, Vietnam. (For further information on the redeployment of the 25th Infantry Division, see the Keystone After Action Report.)

Enemy activity within the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations (AO) remained at a low level during the first week of the reporting period (1-7 November) as main force units avoided contact, while supporting local force units in the collection of taxes and the procurement of food and ammunition. No one area was notably active as communist commanders put a temporary freeze on operations in anticipation of a change of posture by Allied forces

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near the end of 1970. Ground activity was light and scattered during the week while only two mining incidents were reported resulting in three US soldiers wounded.

The redeployment of the 25th Infantry Division was another factor contributing to the generally low level of activity reported during the first week of November. Changes in task organization and a great amount of personnel turbulence hampered combat operations by 25th Infantry Division units. The 1st and 3rd Brigades prepared for redeployment during the week and the maneuver battalions from these two brigades, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry; 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-Troop D); 2nd Battalion (Mech), 22nd Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor; 4th Battalion (Mech), 23rd Infantry; 4th Battalion; 9th Infantry; and 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry began standing down. However, contacts with enemy units did occur as four were reported in Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia and Binh Duong Provinces. B/1-27 Inf killed four enemy soldiers at 1855 hours on 2 November with claymore mines 4.5 kms southeast of Dau Tieng (XT528445). They evacuated three AK47 rifles, one RPG launcher, 12 hand grenades, three back packs, a flag and a small amount of documents from the contact site. There was no return fire. B/1-27 Inf swept the contact site again at 1100 hours on 3 November and evacuated a small amount of documents, medical supplies, one M79 round and two M26 hand grenades. D/1-27 Inf killed two enemy at 0850 hours on 2 November with claymore mines 8 kms southeast of Dau Tieng (XT557430) and evacuated one AK47 rifle and one M16 rifle. There was no enemy return fire. Later, at 1823 hours, D/1-27 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 1.8 kms northwest of the 0850 hours contact (XT540439) but suffered no US casualties. Fire was returned by organic weapons with unknown results. One AK47 rifle was evacuated. A further sweep of the area at 0900 hours by D/1-27 Inf on 3 November resulted in the destruction of eight bunkers, three cooking positions and one underground oven. They evacuated two hammocks, three uniforms, 20 pounds of rice, two pounds of sugar, two canteens, two helmets, one flashlight, three RPG rounds, 50X.45 caliber rounds, one M26 hand grenade, two ChiCom hand grenades, 30 feet of time fuse, four blasting caps and miscellaneous cooking utensils. C/1-27 Inf killed one enemy with organic weapons fire 5 kms southeast of Dau Tieng (XT524438) at 1137 hours on 5 November and evacuated one AK47 rifle, one rucksack and a small amount of documents. A night defensive position (NDP) of C/3-4 Cav located 6 kms east of Go Dau Ha (XT456256) received two 82mm mortar rounds, three RPG rounds and small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy at 0030 hours on 6 November resulting in two US soldiers killed and five wounded. Two RPG rounds were evacuated from the contact area during a sweep.

The 2nd Brigade, during the first week of November, continued to operate as part of the 25th Infantry Division in Operation TOAN THANG IV. The 2nd Brigade's maneuver battalions were the 1st Battalion (Mech), 5th Infantry, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry and 4th Battalion (Mech), 23rd Infantry which operated in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. There were three contacts with the enemy during the week resulting in five enemy killed. The most significant contact occurred at 1130 hours on 1 November when a UH1H helicopter from the 240th Airmobile Company received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 7 kms west of Bearcat (Y8075987). The aircraft

suffered no hits. C/1-5 Inf (M) reacted and engaged the enemy force with a light fire team (IFT) and artillery resulting in five enemy killed. One RPG launcher, two RPG boosters, one RPG pack, one AK47 rifle, one K54 pistol, one US carbine, seven RPG rounds, two US rifle grenades, one M26 hand grenade, 350 pounds of rice, two pistol belts and two field packs with miscellaneous clothing were evacuated. There were no US casualties. A/B/D/3-22 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, artillery and IFT 8 kms northwest of Black Horse (YT395032) at 0910 hours on 2 November with unknown results. Enemy small arms fire killed one US soldier, wounded three and wounded one Kit Carson Scout. Four bunkers and one US claymore mine were destroyed on a sweep of the area. C/1-5 Inf (M) received small arms fire and hand grenades from an estimated 15 enemy 4 kms northwest of Long Thanh (YS118-945) at 1830 hours on 6 November resulting in two US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons with unknown results.

The 1st and 3rd Brigades continued to disengage from combat during the second week of November (8-14 November) with only one contact reported. A NDP of A/C/3-4 Cav 9 kms south of Dau Tieng (XT463382) received three 60mm mortar rounds, two RPG rounds and small arms fire from six to eight enemy at 2127 hours on 9 November resulting in 11 US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons and artillery with unknown results.

USARV General Order 10719 established the 2nd Brigade as a separate brigade under the operational control of II Field Force, Vietnam on 8 November. The 2nd Brigade continued operating in Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh and Bien Hoa (Nhon Trach District) Provinces during the second week of November with three maneuver battalions targeted against the 274 NVA Regiment, 74 NVA Artillery Regiment and the 84th Rear Service Group. The enemy continued to avoid contact and concentrated on conducting political reindoctrination and training in preparation for renewed combat activity in December. There were nine enemy initiated incidents during the week of which two were attacks by fire and seven were ground attacks. A total of 12 enemy soldiers were killed, one Hoi Chanh received and eight individual and two crew-served weapons captured during the week. The most significant contact occurred on 12 November when C/3-22 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 10 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT370033) at 0845 hours resulting in three US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons, artillery, IFT and airstrikes with unknown results. Scattered firing continued and, at 1255 hours, R/3-22 Inf was inserted 1.5 kms southeast of the C/3-22 Inf contact (YT363030) as a reinforcement. Sniper fire at 1515 hours killed one US soldier and wounded another from R/3-22 Inf. Fire was returned by organic weapons with unknown results. A MEDEVAC UH1H helicopter received small arms fire at 1530 hours while attempting to dustoff the wounded. The UH1H suffered moderate damage and was forced to land 300 meters southwest of C/3-22 Inf's position. The UH1H was secured by one platoon from A/1-5 Inf (M) until extracted at 1750 hours. At 1600 hours, C/3-22 Inf again received heavy small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire resulting in two US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned by two IFTs, airstrikes and organic weapons. One 7.62 ChiCom machine gun, one RPG launcher and one RPG round were evacuated from the area after contact was broken. The area was again swept on 13 November by D/3-22 Inf and they

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located four enemy dead, eight bunkers with overhead cover, six B40 rounds, a small amount of documents and medical supplies, antenna wire and a small amount of batteries at 1420 hours in the vicinity YT378032. The documents identified the enemy unit as the D1 Battalion of the 274 NVA Regiment. The enemy base camp was approximately 250 meters in width with 22 bunkers with overhead cover and fighting positions set up.

The 1st and 3rd Brigades continued on stand down during the last two weeks of November. On 25 November, the 25th Infantry Division held its Farewell Ceremony at Cu Chi Base Camp attended by General Creighton Abrams, COMUSMACV, General Do Cao Tri, III CTZ Commander as well as by 25th Infantry Division and GVN personnel.

The 2nd Brigade continued operating in Bien Hoa (Nhon Trach District), Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces during the third week of November (15-21 November) with three maneuver battalions. Enemy activity was light in the 2nd Bde's AO with 12 enemy initiated incidents reported of which one was an attack by fire, nine were ground attacks, one was terrorism and one was aircraft receiving ground fire. Five enemy soldiers were killed and five individual weapons were captured by 2nd Brigade units during the week. Terrorist activities on the periphery of the AO and reports of food gathering activities in the Hung Loc (vic YT325090) area indicated that propaganda and proselytizing efforts as well as food procurement had priority over combat activities. Only two mining incidents were reported during the week resulting in one US soldier wounded.

A/3-22 Inf received small arms fire at 0135 hours on 16 November 11.5 kms west of Xuan Loc (YT342069) from four enemy soldiers armed with one RPG launcher and three AK47 rifles resulting in one US soldier wounded. Scattered firing continued until morning but there were no further US casualties. Enemy losses were unknown. C/2-12 Inf received one hand grenade while sweeping an area 9 kms northeast of Black Horse (YT527003) at 1210 hours on 16 November resulting in three US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons with unknown results. C/3-22 Inf engaged two to three enemy 9 kms south of Black Horse (YS384885) at 1545 hours on 19 November with organic weapons, forward air controller (FAC), LFT and artillery with unknown results. Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier. Contact was lost at 1615 hours. A mechanical ambush set out by B/3-22 Inf and the 415 RF Company 5 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT415056) detonated at 0645 hours on 20 November resulting in two enemy killed and the location of heavy blood trails heading off to the northwest. One AK47 rifle, one US.45 caliber pistol, two rucksacks containing 113 rounds of AK47 ammo, 10X.45 caliber rounds, several personal pictures, one promotion slip and a small amount of documents were evacuated. The captured documents identified the 21B Recon section of the 274 NVA Regiment. The most significant contact of the week occurred at 1515 hours on 20 November when Team 10, Company F (Rgr), 75th Infantry while on patrol received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 19 kms east of Black Horse (YS634-936) resulting in two US soldiers wounded. They returned fire with small arms, hand grenades and LST, killing three of the enemy. They evacuated one AK50 rifle, two AK47 rifles, one 5-kilo bag of rice, five pounds of salt, one

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civilian radio, one hammock, one poncho liner, two batteries and a small amount of documents. The team was extracted at 1715 hours. The captured documents identified the signal section, B. Long Province Headquarters. D/3-22 Inf located and destroyed 14 bunkers with overhead cover at 1045 hours on 21 November 2 kms west of the 3-22 Inf contact of 12 November (YT390030). A dead body located in a grave nearby was credited to the 3-22 Inf contact on 12 November.

Enemy activity throughout the 2nd Bde's AO remained at a low level during the fourth week of November (22-30 November). There were nine ground contacts and two attacks by fire during the week resulting in 10 enemy killed, three prisoner-of-war captured and six individual weapons evacuated. The most significant increase in activity occurred on 25 and 26 November with a series of contacts in Nhon Trach District and an attack on Suoi Tre village (YT2505). Sensor activity and visual reconnaissance revealed consistently heavy trail activity south of the Dong Nai River, in northern Trang Bom District (Bien Hoa Province). This movement between War Zone D and the 2nd Bde's AO was a major infiltration and supply route used by the enemy. However, operations along QL (Highway) 1 and in War Zone D hindered the flow of supplies and forced the enemy to rely heavily on the local populace for foodstuffs. This reliance was evident by the enemy's increased presence in the Sparrow Valley area (YT5401) where the rice harvest was being gathered by the local villagers and along QL 1 where a "shadow supply system" was set up in the vicinity of Bau Ca, Hung Nghia and Hung Loc villages. Those supplies were brought into the area from Saigon, Bien Hoa and Xuan Loc and used to feed the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 274 NVA Regiment which were operating south of the Suzannah and Ong Que Rubber Plantations.

C/2-12 Inf and the 231 RF Company received small arms fire from an estimated three individuals 8 kms north of Xuan Loc (YT443152) at 0953 hours on 24 November resulting in one US soldier and one RF soldier killed. Fire was returned by organic weapons, LST and FAC resulting in one VC killed. A sweep of the area located one Vietnamese newspaper, one booklet containing names of local force personnel, 15 AK47 rounds and a heavy blood trail. On 25 November at 1705 hours, Sgt/Flame/1-5 Inf (M) and the 291/105 RF Companies engaged three to four enemy 4 kms south of Long Thanh (YS131880) with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed, two prisoners-of-war captured and one K74 pistol evacuated. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no Allied casualties. One of the PWs identified the unit as the Phuoc My Village Guerrilla Force which had last been identified on 16 October by C Hoi Chanh. The mission of the unit was to collect taxes and spread propaganda in Phuoc Kien (Phuoc My) and My Phan villages. The taxes collected were used to buy rice. Morale was low because of inadequate food and ammunition. R/3-22 Inf killed one enemy soldier at 1600 hours on 28 November 10 kms west of Xuan Loc (YT355076) with small arms fire. One AK47 rifle and three magazines were evacuated. A mechanical ambush detonated at 1645 hours on 30 November 10 kms south-southwest of Black Horse (YS395869). D/3-22 Inf engaged the area with 81mm mortars. A sweep located one enemy KIA (BC) and one prisoner-of-war along with one AK47 rifle, one RPG launcher and two rucksacks containing food, clothing and documents. The documents identified the postal section.

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of SR-4. The most significant contact of the week occurred at 1755 hours on 30 November when B/3-22 Inf received small arms and B40 fire from an unknown number of enemy 500 meters west of the village of Hung Nghia (YT294096). Fire was returned by organic weapons and LFT resulting in seven enemy soldiers killed and four AK47 rifles and one K54 pistol evacuated. Documents taken from the bodies identified the 74 PVA Artillery Regiment. The group was probably on a rice resupply mission from the regimental base area in the vicinity YT2703 to the Hung Nghia, Hung Loc area where a shadow supply system operated.

2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division forces killed 28 and captured three of the enemy during the month of November, received one Hoi Chanh, accounted for 25 individual weapons and two crew served weapons (captured) and 1.5 tons of rice (captured or destroyed). Bde forces destroyed seven mines and booby traps while detonating five during the month resulting in five US soldiers wounded and one US killed.

The 2nd Bde continued operating in Bien Hoa (Nhon Trach District), Long Khanh (Xuan Loc District) and Phuoc Tuy Provinces during the first week of December (1-7 December) with four maneuver battalions targeted against the 274 PVA Regt, 74 NVA Arty Regt and 84th Rear Service Group and local guerrilla forces. Enemy activity remained at a low level as main and local force units avoided contact to engage in resupply activities. Four enemy soldiers were killed, one prisoner-of-war was captured and seven individual weapons were evacuated by 2nd Bde forces during the week. Only one mining incident was reported resulting in one US soldier killed and one wounded.

The most significant contact of the week occurred at 2130 hours on 2 December when B/1-27 Inf with the 105 RF and 64 FF Companies ambushed an unknown number of enemy 4 kms southwest of Long Thanh (YS103899) with organic weapons resulting in two enemy killed, one prisoner-of-war captured and two M16 rifles and one AK47 rifle evacuated. Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier and one RF soldier. The PW identified his unit as the Phuoc Thien Guerrilla force whose mission was to provide village security. C/2-12 Inf received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated five enemy soldiers armed with M16 rifles 7 kms north of Xuan Loc (YT437151) at 1100 hours on 4 December resulting in four US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons and LFT with unknown results. D/2-12 Inf engaged three to four enemy carrying rucksacks with organic weapons and artillery 12.5 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT555013) at 1230 hours on 5 December resulting in one enemy killed and one AK47 rifle with three full magazines, one RPG round, one pistol belt and a small amount of batteries and documents evacuated. The documents identified the D445 LF Battalion which normally operated around Hui May Tao (YS7492). This was the first indication of this unit in the area east of the Sparrow Valley (vic YT5201).

The 2nd Bde's four maneuver battalions continued operating in the three province area during the second week of December (8-14 December). Enemy activity in the 2nd Bde's AO remained relatively light with the most active area being in the vicinity of Hung Nghia and Hung Loc hamlets (YT3209) as enemy units

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engaged in resupply activities. In Nhon Trach District (Bien Hoa Province), contact with enemy elements was light but several bunker complexes in southern Nhon Trach and northern Rung Sat Special Zone were destroyed, disrupting enemy rear service activities in those areas. Eleven enemy soldiers were killed, one prisoner-of-war was captured and 16 individual weapons were evacuated by Brigade forces.

B/3-22 Inf and Long Khanh PRU engaged an estimated 20 enemy one km east of Hung Nghia hamlet (YT 310091) at 0855 hours on 9 December with organic weapons resulting in two females with NVA rucksacks filled with rice detained. At 1010 hours, contact was reestablished but broken immediately, resulting in one PRU soldier wounded. Later, at 1350 hours, B/3-22 Inf and PRU engaged three enemy 100 meters east of the 0855 hours contact resulting in one enemy killed, one wounded NVA prisoner-of-war captured and two AK47 rifles evacuated. The PW was a member of the 2nd Platoon, 2nd Company, 2nd Battalion, 274 NVA Regiment and had been on a food supply mission for the 2nd Company when captured. This was the normal area of operations of the 2nd Battalion. The most significant contact of the week occurred at 1920 hours on 10 December when a mechanical ambush set out by B/3-22 Inf 1 km east of Hung Loc hamlet (YT 331095) detonated. B/3-22 Inf engaged the area with organic weapons and received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy. There were no U.S. casualties. The area was swept at 0730 hours on 11 December, resulting in the location of five enemy dead and the evacuation of four AK47 rifles, 13 AK47 magazines with 483 rounds, two U.S. hand grenades, three U.S. pistol belts, 10 pounds of civilian clothes, three pounds of medicine and five pounds of documents. The documents identified the Rear Service Section of the 274 NVA Regiment. Three enemy soldiers were killed by a mechanical ambush at 2145 hours on 12 December 2 kms east of Hung Loc hamlet (YT342085). B/3-22 Inf evacuated one AK47 rifle from the site.

Enemy activity remained relatively light throughout the 2nd Brigade's AO during the third week of December (15-21 December), however, there was a slight increase over last week. The area with the most activity continued to be south of Highway QL 1 and west of Highway ITL 2 as small groups of enemy engaging in resupply missions were contacted. Allied operations around Hung Nghia and Hung Loc hamlets on QL 1 have severely disrupted enemy resupply activities and forced the enemy to shift his efforts to procure supplies east of those hamlets. Another area of increased enemy activity was in the Viet Cuong Plantation (vic YS4889). This plantation was used as a rear service area for MR-7 units and as a major east-west commo-liaison route linking southwestern Bien Hoa Province to the May Tao Mountain area (YS7491). The 2nd Bde's four maneuver battalions killed 10 of the enemy, captured one prisoner-of-war, and evacuated nine individual weapons during the week. There were four mining incidents reported resulting in three US soldiers wounded.

Two enemy were killed at 0540 and 1925 hours on 15 December by mechanical ambushes set out by A/3-22 Inf 4 kms south of Hung Loc (YT339058 and YT338057). A/3-22 Inf, in the same area (YT337058), engaged one individual at 1100 hours on 16 December resulting in one AK47 rifle with one magazine and one rucksack

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containing food captured. A blood trail was also located. A LOH from D/3-4 Cav was downed by enemy small arms fire 7 kms west of Long Thanh (YS070926) at 1245 hours on 16 December. An aerial rifle platoon (ARP) secured the aircraft until it was extracted. One enemy was killed and one wounded prisoner-of-war was captured by C/3-22 Inf after a mechanical ambush 11 kms west of Black Horse (YS330982) at 0835 hours on 17 December. Two rucksacks containing one M26 hand grenade, a knife, 25 pounds of rice, clothing and documents were evacuated. The documents identified the 274 Regt's headquarters unit which had last been identified west of the Viet Cuong Plantation, vic YS3686. Two enemy were killed by a mechanical ambush detonation at 1712 hours on 18 December 5 kms east of Phuoc An (YS187783). Sgt/Flame/1-5 Inf (M) swept the area and evacuated two AK47 rifles and one AK47 magazine. Husky Compound, vic YT466093, received eight to twelve 81mm mortar rounds, four of which landed in the compound, at 1905 hours on 18 December resulting in 16 US soldiers wounded, one civilian killed and three civilians wounded. Counter mortar fire was returned to the northeast, vic YT480113, with unknown results. R/3-22 Inf engaged five enemy soldiers 2 kms southeast of Hung Nghia (YT315080) with organic weapons at 1155 hours on 19 December resulting in two enemy killed. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties. One K54 pistol and one AK50 rifle were evacuated from the contact site. C/1-5 Inf (M) received two Hoi Chanh 9 kms west of Long Thanh (YS051924) at 1255 hours on 20 December. Both men were members of the rear service team of the 4th Company, 4th Battalion of SR-4 which operated in northern Nhon Trach District. R/3-22 Inf engaged 10 enemy with organic weapons 2 kms southeast of Hung Nghia (YT315080) at 1745 hours on 20 December resulting in two enemy killed and two AK47 rifles, two rucksacks and a small amount of documents evacuated. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties. The documents identified the 6th Company, 2nd Battalion, 274 NVA Regt which had been on a resupply mission to Hung Nghia-Hung Loc hamlets.

Enemy activity during the fourth week of December (22-31 December) remained at a low level as enemy main force units avoided contact to engage in resupply activities. The area south of QL 1 in the Hung Nghia area was the most active area in the 2nd Bde's AO during the week. Seventeen enemy were killed, two prisoners-of-war were captured, three Hoi Chanh were received and 28 individual weapons were evacuated by 2nd Bde forces. There were no significant mining incidents reported.

The most significant contact of the week occurred at 2240 hours on 23 December when a mechanical ambush set out by B/3-22 Inf 1 km south of Hung Loc (YT322085) detonated. The area was engaged with organic weapons and a Nighthawk resulting in five enemy killed. The enemy force returned fire with hand grenades but there were no US casualties. The contact area was swept by B/3-22 Inf at 0630 hours on 24 December and they received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy resulting in one US soldier wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons and helicopter gunships with unknown results. Three AK47 rifles, one carbine, one rucksack with a small amount of clothing and documents were evacuated from the contact site. The documents identified the C22 Transportation Company, 274 NVA regiment and included a

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comprehensive list identifying the 274 Regiment, the three battalions, all regimental support companies except the C19 Engineer Company and the three staff sections of the Regiment. One enemy was killed and another captured after a mechanical ambush set out by D/3-22 Inf 5 1/2 kms south of Hung Nghia (YT285042) detonated at 0745 hours on 24 December. Documents taken from the enemy body identified the 3rd Battalion, 74th Artillery Regiment which was providing security for the 74th Arty Regimental headquarters located near the contact area. A/2-12 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy in bunkers 13 kms northeast of Black Horse (YT569010) at 1055 hours on 24 December with organic weapons resulting in three enemy killed. The enemy returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons resulting in two US soldiers wounded and one Kit Carson Scout wounded. A IST from D/3-4 Cav received small arms fire at 1630 hours on 25 December from a sampan carrying one individual and some ammo cases 6.5 kms southwest of Long Thanh (YS088898). The sampan was engaged and the ARP/3-4 Cav was inserted in the area. They destroyed the sampan and evacuated one M26 hand grenade, miscellaneous clothing and documents. A further sweep of the contact area at 0805 hours on 26 December resulted in one enemy body located and one K54 pistol, one transistor radio, one stove, two carbine magazines, one poncho and a small amount of documents evacuated. B/1-5 Inf (M) engaged 13 enemy 5 kms south of Hung Loc (YT316044) at 1115 hours on 26 December with organic weapons, IST, artillery and PAC resulting in one prisoner-of-war captured and two Hoi Chanh received. One radio, one English/Vietnamese dictionary, clothing and documents were evacuated. The PW identified his unit as the C20 Signal Company, 274 NVA Regt which had last been identified in the same area on 16 December. The C20 was being used on resupply missions to the Hung Loc-Hung Nghia area. B/3-22 Inf with the 984 RF Company engaged an estimated 30 enemy in the open 1 km southeast of Hung Nghia (YT307087) at 1810 hours on 26 December. Heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire was exchanged and a IFT flew in support. One US soldier was wounded while enemy losses were unknown. Scattered firing continued until 2045 hours when contact was broken. C/1-11 ACR maneuvered into blocking positions north, east and west of the area in preparation for a sweep the next morning. A sweep by 3-22 Inf and the 984 RF Company at 0855 hours on 27 December located two enemy bodies, three AK47 rifles and six AK47 magazines. An OH58 helicopter from D/3-17 Air Cav, while supporting 2nd Bde forces, crashed and burned 18 kms northwest of Xuan Loc (YT3824) at 1145 hours on 30 December after hitting a power line due to mechanical problems. Three US soldiers, the crew of the LOH, were killed. A/1-5 Inf (M) and some RF's secured the downed aircraft.

The 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division forces killed 42 of the enemy and captured five during the month of December, received five Hoi Chanh, accounted for 55 individual weapons and 490 pounds of rice (captured). Bde forces destroyed 16 mines and booby traps while detonating six during the month resulting in four US wounded and one US killed.

The 2nd Brigade continued operating in the three province area of Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy during the first week of January (1-7 January) with four maneuver battalions against the 274 NVA Regt, 74 NVA Arty Regt,

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84th Rear Service Group, elements from SR-4 and MR-7 and 100% guerrilla units. Enemy activity remained at a low level as main and local force units avoided contact to engage in resupply activities. There were eight significant contacts with the enemy resulting in 10 enemy killed and 12 individual weapons evacuated. There was only one mining incident reported but there were no US casualties.

The most significant contact of the week occurred at 0710 hours on 3 January when a mechanical ambush set out by C/1-27 Inf 8 kms southwest of Black Horse (YS391899) detonated killing three enemy soldiers. They evacuated two AK47 rifles; one K54 pistol, three rucksacks, clothing, 20 AK47 armor piercing rounds, 100 AK47 rounds, 14 K54 rounds and one pound of documents from the site. The documents identified elements of SR-4 Finance and Economy Section and the place of capture was a rear-service area for SR-4 and MR-7. B/2-12 Inf located six bunkers and a sapper training area 14 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YS564994) at 1110 hours on 3 January. They destroyed the bunkers and evacuated one typewriter, one sewing machine, some pill bottles, several notebooks and diaries, five .50 caliber ammo cans of documents, medical supplies, one map and one M1 carbine. The documents identified elements of the Xuan Loc District Headquarters and subordinate units. Two enemy soldiers were killed with artillery and IST by C/1-27 Inf 1.5 kms northwest of the 0710 hours contact (YS383912) at 1405 hours on 3 January. C/3-22 Inf suffered two US wounded at 1405 hours on 3 January when they engaged an unknown number of enemy in bunkers 7 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT396046). C/3-22 Inf swept the contact area at 0830 hours on 4 January and located two separate bunker complexes with a total of 38 bunkers. They destroyed the bunkers and evacuated papers and documents, miscellaneous cooking utensils and clothing, five shovels, five full AK47 magazines, two full M16 magazines, 120 AK47 rounds, 100 M16 rounds, eight NVA ponchos, one six volt battery, five AT tripwire detonators, two CS grenades, nine US canteens and medicine. A/2-12 Inf received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of enemy 13 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT565012) at 1315 hours on 5 January resulting in two US soldiers killed and three wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed. They evacuated three RPG rounds, three RPG boosters, one RPG launcher, 25 pounds of rice, one hammer and a small amount of documents and clothing from the contact site. A sapper training area with four bunkers and two hootches was located by B/1-3 Inf (M) 14 kms north of Xuan Loc (YT441227) at 1330 hours on 6 January. They destroyed the bunkers and hootches and evacuated one defused 105mm round, five pounds of rice, 1800 M16 rounds, 12X7.62 rounds, one ChiCom claymore, one RPG round, 10 full M16 magazines, two full carbine magazines, 300 meters of commo wire, 20 ponchos and several pounds of maps and documents. A/2-12 Inf received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire from an estimated 10 enemy 13 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT567011) at 1450 hours on 6 January. Fire was returned with organic weapons and artillery resulting in one enemy killed and one AK47 rifle with two full magazines evacuated. There were no US casualties. C/3-22 Inf engaged two enemy 2.5 kms south of Hung Nghia (YT310072) with organic weapons, IST and artillery at 1558 hours on 6 January and killed one. One AK47 rifle was evacuated. A UH1H helicopter from 2nd Bde Aviation

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detonated a booby trap with tripwire 9 kms southeast of Black Horse (YS485895) while taking off at 1235 hours on 7 January and crashed resulting in one US soldier killed and the UH1H destroyed. Two enemy soldiers were engaged by C/3-22 Inf with small arms 2.75 kms south of Hung Nghia (YT310068) at 1545 hours on 7 January resulting in one enemy killed and one AK50 rifle evacuated.

Enemy activity during the second week of January (8-14 January) remained at a low level as enemy units generally avoided contact. The 2nd Bde continued operating with four maneuver battalions in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. Thirteen enemy soldiers were killed, three were captured, one Hoi Chanh was received and 29 individual weapons were captured by 2nd Bde forces during the week. There was one mining incident reported resulting in two US soldiers wounded.

A/3-22 Inf engaged an estimated six enemy soldiers 10 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT368033) with organic weapons at 1150 hours on 8 January resulting in one enemy killed and one M1 carbine with two magazines evacuated. At 1700 hours on 8 January, R/1-27 Inf engaged eight individuals 7 kms south of Black Horse (YS417892) with organic weapons and artillery. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties. A sweep of the area revealed numerous trails but no bodies. C/1-27 Inf located a grave containing three enemy bodies 3 kms west of the R/1-27 Inf contact site (YS384896) at 1335 hours on 11 January. The enemy body count (BC) was credited to the R/1-27 Inf contact of 8 January. D/2-12 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons at 1325 hours on 9 January 12.5 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT564023) resulting in one prisoner-of-war captured and one M1 carbine, three rucksacks and 30 M1 rounds evacuated. One enemy body from this contact was located in a grave 700 meters southeast of the contact at 1130 hours on 13 January by D/2-12 Inf. Later, at 1630 hours on 9 January, D/2-12 Inf engaged five enemy with organic weapons 1 km northwest of the 1325 hours contact (YT558031) resulting in one enemy soldier killed and 40 pounds of rice and two M79 grenade launchers evacuated. A cache was located by B/2-12 Inf 14.5 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YS576997) at 1730 hours on 10 January. They evacuated 40 pounds of rice, three US claymores, one NVA wallet, one NVA flag, 25 AK47 rounds, two .50 caliber cans with documents and medical supplies, one SKS rifle, two M1 carbines and four M1 rifles. C/3-22 Inf engaged two enemy with organic weapons 2 kms southwest of Hung Nghia (YT285082) at 1145 hours on 11 January resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK50 rifle, one PPS-43 sub-machinegun, two AK47 vests with six full magazines, two medical bags with penicillin, quinine and bandages, one bread plant, 25 pounds of rice, one wallet and NVA medals. B/2-12 Inf located two caches on 11 January 14 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YS563994 and YS579994). They evacuated from the first site at 1308 hours four M1 rifles, two typewriters, one M1 carbine, five ammo cans of documents, 12X82mm mortar rounds, one .38 caliber pistol, one SKS rifle, one Thompson machinegun, one tape recorder, and printing materials. At 1536 hours, they evacuated one M1 carbine, one .38 caliber pistol, two M1 rifles, two SKS rifles, one Thompson machinegun, one tape recorder, one typewriter and one printing press. Six US soldiers were wounded while destroying a bunker in the cache area. A fragmentation grenade concealed in burning clothing exploded, wounding the men. B/1-5 Inf (M) located a food cache in a small base camp consisting of nine bunkers and two bootches 5 kms north of Hung Loc (YT328145) at 1735.

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hours on 12 January. They evacuated 900 pounds of rice, 800 pounds of corn, tea and tobacco from the area. The base camp was destroyed, B/1-5 Inf (N), at an NDP 2.5 Kms north of Hung Loc (YT326122), engaged 15-20 enemy after a trip flare activation with organic weapons and Night Hawk resulting in two enemy killed, two prisoners-of-war captured, and the evacuation of one RPG launcher, one RPG round, two AK47 rifles and one cooking pot. The PWs identified their unit as the 1st Bn, 274 NVA Regt which began operating north of QL 1 since December. A/2-12 Inf received automatic weapons and RPG fire from an estimated 10 enemy 19 kms east-southeast of Xuan Loc (YT637017) at 0750 hours on 14 January resulting in nine US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons and 81mm mortars with unknown results. R/3-22 Inf killed one enemy with a mechanical ambush 15 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YS322998) at 1007 hours on 14 January. They evacuated one AK50 rifle with three full magazines, one rucksack, 126 AK rounds, one AK vest, one US hammock, one US entrenching tool, one claymore bag and miscellaneous clothing. A UH1H helicopter from the 118th Assault Helicopter Company, while supporting elements of the 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf 9 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YS386036), crashed and burned due to mechanical failure at 1255 hours on 14 January. The UH1H was destroyed and one US soldier, LTC Bartron, CO of the 3-22 Inf was slightly injured.

The 2nd Bde continued operating in the same three province areas during the third week of January (15-21 January) with four maneuver battalions. Enemy resupply activities increased north of QL 1 as operations by Allied units south of Hung Loc/Hung Nghia hamlets disrupted the "shadow supply system". The Bao Ham area, via YT328142, lying astride a north-south infiltration route, served as a dispersing point for enemy supplies with the closure of Hung Loc/Hung Nghia hamlets to easy enemy access. There were 16 significant contacts during the week resulting in 23 enemy soldiers killed, two prisoners-of-war captured and 12 individual weapons evacuated.

Two enemy soldiers were killed by R/1-27 Inf at 1025 hours and 1440 hours on 15 January 7 kms southwest of Black Horse (YS409889 and YS401387). Two US soldiers were wounded in the second engagement. One enemy AK47 rifle was evacuated while a small bunker complex was destroyed. At 1445 hours on 15 January, C/1-27 Inf engaged an estimated 20 enemy soldiers in a bunker complex 11 kms west of Black Horse (YS321969) with organic weapons and helicopter gunships resulting in two enemy killed. Enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire wounded 14 US soldiers and killed one. A UH1H MEDEVAC helicopter received small arms ground fire while coming in for a dustoff and crashed. The helicopter was lifted out later. There were no casualties on the aircraft. The most significant contact of the week occurred at 0530 hours on 17 January when C/3-22 Inf had a mechanical ambush detonate 1.5 kms south of Hung Nghia (YT292081) resulting in five enemy soldiers killed and one AK47 rifle, 11 rucksacks, two ponchos, toilet articles, two medical bags with penicillin, vitamin C, vitamin B-1, sodium, bandages, two bags of food, 175 pounds of rice, 12 flashlight batteries, one bag of sugar and an unknown amount of marijuana evacuated. Documents captured identified the 2nd Bn, 74 NVA Regt which was believed to be dispersed in SR-4. The enemy KIA's wore on a medical resupply mission when contacted. C/3-22 Inf engaged two enemy soldiers 2 kms southeast of its 17 January contact (YT311072) with

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organic weapons and IST resulting in two enemy KIA (BE) and the evacuation of one rucksack, one US canteen, one NVA pistol belt, one poncho, eating utensils and a small amount of documents. The documents identified the 2nd Bn, 274 NVA Regt. The area of capture was the normal AO for the 2nd Battalion. D/2-12 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy 6.5 kms north-west of An Loc (YT326164) with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, two US hand grenades, six rucksacks, clothing, one M16 rifle, a small amount of medical supplies, documents, personal equipment, 39x30 caliber rounds, 33 K54 pistol rounds and one booby trapped 105mm round. B/2-12 Inf located a south-west trail with indications of recent activity 14 kms southeast of Black Horse (YS567922) at 1350 hours on 20 January. At 1600 hours, they engaged six to eight enemy with organic weapons with unknown results. The enemy returned fire with small arms, RPG rounds and hand grenades resulting in one US soldier killed and six wounded. D/3-22 Inf received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an unknown size enemy force 5 kms south of An Loc (YT390043) at 1557 hours on 21 January resulting in one US soldier killed and two wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, IST and tactical airstrikes with unknown results. They destroyed two bunkers, five fighting positions and three trenches. At 1755 hours on 22 January, D/3-22 Inf located three bodies 600 meters southeast of the 21 January contact (YT389038).

The 2nd Brigade continued operating with four maneuver battalions in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces during the fourth week of January (22-31 January). Enemy activity remained unchanged from the previous week. There were 21 significant contacts reported resulting in 26 enemy killed and 18 weapons captured.

The most significant contact of the week occurred at 0955 hours on 22 January when a LOH from D/3-4 Cav received ground fire 4.5 kms northeast of Binh Son (YS254957) and crashed and burned near an enemy bunker. The enemy soldiers in the bunker engaged the downed LOH with small arms fire. A UH1H helicopter from the 240th Airmobile Company attempted to insert a security team but hit a branch and crashed. Team 1A, Company C, 75th Inf (Rgr) was inserted at 1010 hours and received small arms fire from the enemy. They engaged the enemy with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one waterproof bag full of clothing, one flashlight, one intravenous tube, one earphone, three US claymores, eight blasting caps, one full AK47 magazine, one PRC-25 battery and a small amount of documents. At 1155 hours, an aerial rifle platoon from D/3-4 Cav received RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy. US casualties were seven killed (three from the LOH and four from the UH1H) and eight wounded while the two helicopters were destroyed in place. The captured documents identified the Hq of SR4 and the 74th Arty Rgt. B/2-12 engaged two enemy soldiers that were trailing them 12 kms east of Black Horse (YS559939) with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle with two full magazines. Team 2C, Company F, 75th Inf (Rgr) engaged an unknown number of enemy 5 kms southeast of Hung Loc (YT361059) with organic weapons, artillery and IFT resulting in four enemy killed. Enemy small arms fire wounded two US soldiers.

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Two AK 47 rifles were evacuated. C/3-22 Inf engaged an unknown number of enemy 7 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT414037) with organic weapons. The enemy initially returned fire with an M60 machine gun and small arms. At 1235 hours, C/3-22 Inf was engaged by a platoon size enemy force resulting in one US soldier wounded. One enemy soldier was killed while one M79 grenade launcher, one US bayonet, 200 M60 rounds, one US entrenching tool, one US claymore, several blasting caps, two C-ration cans and 15 AK47 rounds were evacuated. A mechanical ambush set out by D/2-12 Inf 11 kms west of Black Horse (YS325967) detonated at 1545 hours on 27 January resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, one M1 carbine, one machete, two full AK magazines, one full carbine magazine, two rucksacks, two US water bags and a small amount of documents. D/1-27 Inf killed three enemy soldiers by mechanical ambushes in two actions at 1105 and 1510 hours on 28 January 11 kms west of Black Horse. (YS335956). Three AK47 rifles and a small amount of documents were evacuated. A/1-27 Inf engaged five enemy carrying weapons with organic weapons 11 kms south of Black Horse (YS404866) at 1700 hours on 29 January resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two rucksacks, one SKS rifle with nine rounds, one US field jacket, one flashlight, one pistol belt and a small amount of documents. The documents identified the rear service elements of SR-4, specifically the D10 Sapper Battalion, which operated in the Rung Sat Special Zone. A patrol from C/1-5 Inf (M) detonated a booby trapped hand grenade 3 kms northwest of Long Thanh (YS113936) at 0923 hours on 30 January resulting in eight US soldiers wounded. C/3-22 Inf killed one enemy 8 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT405030) at 1600 hours on 31 January. One AK47 rifle was evacuated from the contact.

The 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division forces killed 72 of the enemy and captured five prisoners-of-war during the month of January, received three Hoi Chanh and accounted for 71 individual weapons and 949 pounds of rice captured.

The 2nd Brigade continued operating in Bien Hoa, southern Long Khanh and northern Phuoc Tuy Provinces during the first week of February (1-7 February) with four maneuver battalions against the 274 NVA Regiment, 74 NVA Artillery Regiment, Rear Service Group of MR-7, 3d Battalion, 33d Regiment, SR-4 Headquarters and Rear Service elements and local guerrilla units. Ground activity remained at a low level, characterized by the detonation of a number of mechanical ambushes. The major enemy activity consisted of the emplacement of mines and booby traps to harass 2nd Brigade units. Five mining incidents were reported during the week resulting in one US soldier wounded and three Regional Forces soldiers killed. This enemy economy of force measure was due to their limited resources and low number of personnel. Most enemy units were engaged in the procurement of enough food for survival which became more and more difficult with increasing allied pressure. There were five significant contacts with the enemy during the week resulting in nine enemy killed and nine individual weapons captured.

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C/2-12 Inf discovered a munitions production area 4 kms south of Nui May Tao Mountain (YS730868) at 1200 hours on 2 February. They evacuated five watches (two of which were electrically booby trapped), 100 finished detonators for ChiCom mines, 200 electrical blasting caps, 200 non-electrical blasting caps, 300 primers for small arms ammunition, 500 unfinished detonators for ChiCom grenades, 50x9mm rounds and assorted drills, dies and funnels. Team 2C, Company F, 75th Inf (Rgr), engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons, artillery, LST and aerial rifle platoon 4 kms northeast of Trang Bom (YT223151) at 0905 hours on 5 February resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles, one M1 carbine, 120 pounds of rice and a small amount of documents. The enemy returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons but there were no US casualties. The documents indicated that the enemy element belonged to the U-1 Province Provincial Force and was returning from a resupply mission in the Trang Bom area with newly purchased supplies. The enemy were wearing new boots and fatigues similar to those worn by the ARVN. At 1110 hours on 5 February, 1-5 Inf (M) in the vicinity of old FSB Henderson (YT174129) located and evacuated five 105mm rounds, 67 hand grenades, 20 M79 rounds and a large amount of small arms ammunition. Recon, 1-27 Inf engaged an estimated three enemy with organic weapons 3.5 kms north of An Loc (YT378124) at 1210 hours on 6 February resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one RPG launcher, four B40 rounds, five boxes of M16 ammunition, two M79 rounds, one ChiCom claymore and tripwire, cooking utensils, one 105mm round and a small amount of documents. Eight bunkers in the area were destroyed. The documents identified the D440 Battalion and the Cao Su District force. One company of the D440 Bn was assigned to the Cao Su District force when the battalion was disbanded in October 1970. The Cao Su District force normally operated in the area east of the Checkerboard Rubber Plantation (YT3504) although small elements have been identified north of highway QL 1. A mechanical ambush set out by A/1-27 Inf 7 kms northwest of Hung Nghia (YT273164) detonated at 0650 hours on 7 February resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, one AK50 rifle, one M16 rifle, one K54 pistol, two recoilless rifle rounds, six 60mm mortar rounds, three rucksacks, one compass, pots and pans, a small amount of tobacco, two hammocks and a small amount of documents. The documents identified the C18 Anti-Aircraft Company, 274 NVA Regiment which was operating in the role of a transportation element. Supplies, mainly munitions, were moved south normally from War Zone D by both the C18 and C22 Transportation Companies, 274 NVA Regiment.

The 2nd Brigade continued operating in the three province area of Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy during the second week in February (3-14 February). Enemy activity increased over the previous week, especially north of QL-1. There were ten significant contacts during the week resulting in 18 enemy killed, two prisoner-of-war captured and 31 individual weapons evacuated. There were two mining incidents reported resulting in three US soldiers killed and one wounded.

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Recon/3-22 Inf engaged the area of a mechanical ambush detonation 7.5kms southeast of Hung Loc (YT353026) at 1710 hours on 8 February with organic weapons resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, one full AK magazine, 60 pounds of sweet potatoes, five pounds of cooked rice, three hammocks, clothing, eating utensils and three wallets with papers. The captured documents identified the 274 NVA Regiment Hqs. This Regimental Hqs was identified again on 10 February in the vicinity of YT 325013 when snipers from 3-22 Inf engaged two individuals, killing one. The enemy KIA was a member of the military staff sections of the 274 Regiment. Snipers from the 3-22 Inf again engaged four individuals 8 kms south of Hung Loc (YT326014) with organic weapons resulting in one enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war captured and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle and one K54 pistol. The KIA was identified as a member of the J85 Transportation Group of MR-7 and the PW as a member of the K15 Hospital of MR-7. According to the source, the group was on a resupply mission to Thai Giao, vic YT4301. D/1-27 Inf and the 621 RF Company detonated one unknown type booby trap 7 kms north of Hung Loc (YT324163) at 1130 hours on 9 February resulting in three US soldiers killed, four RF killed, one Kit Carson Scout killed and five RF wounded. At 1140 hours, they received small arms fire and returned fire with artillery, LFT and airstrikes. At 1230 hours, a MEDEVAC UH1H on a dustoff was hit with eight rounds of small arms fire and was downed. The UH1H was recovered at 1445 hours. A/1-27 Inf received small arms fire from an unknown number of enemy 5 kms northwest of Hung Nghia (YT271139) at 1731 hours on 9 February. Fire was returned with organic weapons resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles with two full magazines, three rucksacks and a small amount of documents. There were no US casualties. The documents identified an element of the Bien Hoa Province Party Committee and the U-1 Province Party Committee. A/3-22 Inf received automatic weapons fire while moving along a stream bank 8 kms south of Hung Loc (YT340016) at 1000 hours on 11 February. Fire was returned with organic weapons and IST with negative results. At 1255 hours, contact was reestablished with an estimated 50 enemy. A LOH received ground fire but sustained no hits. A Command and Control helicopter received eight small arms hits but suffered only light damage. Contact was broken at 1335 hours. US casualties were two wounded while one Kit Carson Scout was killed. There were no enemy losses reported. A/3-22 Inf engaged two enemy with organic weapons and IST at 0710 hours on 12 February 7.5 kms south of Hung Loc (YT335018) resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles, 40 AK rounds and a small amount of documents. The documents identified the 274 NVA Regimental Headquarters which normally operated in the contact area. An ambush patrol and snipers from A/1-27 Inf engaged three enemy with organic weapons 9 kms northwest of Hung Nghia (YT276180) at 1900 on 13 February resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of two AK47 rifles, three rucksacks, three hammocks, \$1085 in Vietnamese piasters and a small amount of documents. The captured documents identified elements of the Regimental Headquarters and the 3rd Battalion of the 274 NVA Regiment. The 3rd Battalion was dispersed south of the Binh Son Rubber Plantation (YS1893) while the

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Regimental Headquarters was located northwest of the Ong Que Plantation (YS3899). The contacted enemy was probably on a resupply mission. A/1-5 Inf (M) located a small arms cache 13 kms east of Black Horse (YS563946) at 1130 hours on 14 February. They evacuated 13 CKC rifles, one M1 carbine, 30x60mm mortar rounds and documents. A/1-27 Inf engaged seven enemy 9 kms north of Hung Nghia (YT275185) with organic weapons at 1240 hours on 14 February resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle and a small amount of documents. The enemy returned fire with small arms but there were no US casualties. The documents identified two companies of the 2nd Battalion, 274 NVA Regiment, which was located west of the Checkerboard Rubber Plantation (YT3404). A/1-27 Inf engaged three enemy 500 meters southeast of their 1240 hours contact (YT276180) with organic weapons at 1325 hours resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle and one rucksack with documents.

The 2nd Brigade continued operating in Bien Hoa, southern Long Khanh and northern Phuoc Tuy provinces during the third week of February (15-21 February) with four maneuver battalions. Enemy activity remained at a moderate level with 14 significant contacts resulting in 17 enemy killed and 11 individual weapons captured. Also, 10 enemy bodies from previous contacts were located. There were two mining incidents reported resulting in the destruction of one APC but there were no US casualties.

C/1-27 Inf located five graves south of Binh Loc (YT394132) with five bodies estimated to have been dead for four or five days. The KIA's were credited to Recon/1-27 Inf's contact of 11 February. Also, they destroyed four bunkers, one latrine and one US claymore booby trapped with trip wire. D/3-22 Inf engaged an estimated eight enemy with organic weapons 2 kms southeast of Hung Nghia (YT315084) at 1830 hours on 15 February. The 2nd Platoon, D/3-22 Inf spotted three individuals 700 meters southwest of that contact and engaged with organic weapons resulting in one VC killed. The remaining two fled northwest where one tripped a mechanical ambush resulting in one enemy killed. Two US soldiers were wounded. Two AK47 rifles, one rucksack and some documents were captured. The documents identified the Headquarters, 274 NVA Regiment and the Recon and Medical Companies, 274 NVA Regiment. The place of capture was the normal area of operations for those units. At 1845 hours on 15 February, FSB Heidi (YT515056) received 10-15x60mm mortar rounds and small arms fire resulting in one US soldier killed and 11 US wounded. Fire was returned with Justrors, 105mm howitzers, beehive and killer rounds and mortars to the vicinity of YT51180483 with unknown results. D/3-22 Inf engaged an estimated three enemy soldiers with organic weapons 1.5 kms southwest of Hung Nghia (YT286093) at 0735 on 16 February resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of two rucksacks and some documents. The captured documents identified the 74 NVA Artillery Regiment Headquarters and 3rd Battalion, 74th NVA Artillery Regiment. Both units had last been identified on 17 January by documents in the vicinity of YT290034. C/3-22 Inf located three enemy bodies 6 kms northwest of Black Horse (YT404021) at 1120 hours on 16 February. The enemy dead were killed by Recon/2-12 Inf

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in two engagements 100 meters apart 7 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT517043) at 1710 and 1743 hours on 16 February. Two AK47 rifles were evacuated from the contacts. C/1-27 Inf, while moving along a stream bank 5 kms northwest of Xuan Loc (YT415127), received small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire at 1145 hours on 18 February from an estimated 10-12 enemy resulting in seven US soldiers wounded. Fire was returned with organic weapons, artillery and LST resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle with three full magazines, one K54 pistol, one ammo vest, two B40 rounds, 100 meters of claymore wire, several bunches of bananas, and a small amount of documents. The enemy unit was believed to have been the D6 Sapper Battalion. At 1400 hours on 19 February, C/1-27 Inf was engaged by an unknown size enemy force 500 meters southwest of the previous day's contact (YT414122) with a command detonated mine and small arms fire resulting in one US soldier wounded and one Kit Carson Scout wounded. Fire was returned by organic weapons and 4.2 inch mortars with unknown results. They swept the area and located two enemy bodies in graves, killed in the previous days contact by C/1-27 Inf. Recon/2-12 Inf engaged four enemy 8.5 kms southeast of Xuan Loc (YT530037) with organic weapons at 1055 hours on 20 February resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one K54 pistol and one rucksack. One US soldier was wounded in the contact. They swept the contact area and at 1100 hours received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated 20-25 enemy. Fire was returned by organic weapons, LST and artillery with unknown results. One AK47 rifle, six rucksacks containing cooking utensils and a small amount of documents were evacuated. The documents identified elements of the J85 Transportation Battalion, Rear Service Group, MR-7 which was formed from the 84th Rear Service Group after it was disbanded. A mechanical ambush set out by C/3-22 Inf 7.5 kms southwest of Xuan Loc (YT398036) detonated at 1137 hours on 20 February resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle with three full magazines and a small amount of documents. The documents identified the Mortar Company and Headquarters, 274 NVA Regt. The documents indicated that Hung Nghia (YT300095) continued to be an important supply point.

Enemy activity declined during the fourth week of February (22-28 February) in the 2nd Bde's AO as the enemy avoided contact to engage in resupply activities. The detonation of mechanical ambushes was the predominant form of engagement employed by 2nd Bde forces although small ground contacts did occur. Harassing attacks in the form of indirect fire incidents and the emplacement of mines and booby traps were the enemy's chief tactics throughout the week.

D/3-22 Inf located several bunkers with radio equipment 10 kms east of Black Horse (YS354914) at 0945 hours on 23 February. They evacuated one ChiCom amp meter, one tester, radio wiring, 16 transistor parts, one Japanese radio, two RPG rounds, 283 AK47 rounds and assorted radio parts. The equipment probably belonged to the C2C Signal Company, 274 NVA Regt. D/1-27 Inf engaged 10-12 enemy soldiers 5.5 kms northwest of Hung Nghia (YT279147) with organic weapons, LST and artillery at 1715 hours on 23 February resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle, one flashlight, pills of undetermined type and two letters. These letters identified the

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1st Bn, 74 NVA Arty Regt which was usually located farther northwest than the contact area, near the Dong Nai River. Later, at 1831 hours, D/1-27 Inf spotted and engaged four enemy with organic weapons 400 meters west of the 1715 hours contact with unknown results. Enemy small arms fire wounded one US soldier. A mechanical ambush set out by C/3-22 Inf 300 meters south of Hung Nghia (YT302091) detonated at 0710 hours on 24 February resulting in three enemy killed and the evacuation of one carbine, two rucksacks with bananas, one rucksack with 40X30 caliber rounds, five pounds of rice, one carton of cigarettes, one US ammo pouch, one US pistol belt, one NVA belt, miscellaneous personal gear, one SONI transistor radio and 98,600 \$ VN plasters. The captured documents identified the C11 Requisitioning and Purchasing Company, J85 Transportation Battalion, Rear Service Group, MR-7. Elements of the J85 Bn were last identified on 20 February at YT530037 by documents. The J85 Bn was responsible for resupplying units in southern MR-7. A mechanical ambush set out by A/1-27 Inf 4 kms southwest of Hung Nghia (YT267070) detonated at 1800 hours on 25 February resulting in two enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle. There were no US casualties. D/3-17 Cav with elements of the 260 RF Company engaged an unknown number of enemy with organic weapons and LFT 3 kms west-northwest of Long Thanh (YS110930) at 1820 hours on 25 February resulting in one enemy killed and one M16 rifle evacuated. Enemy small arms fire wounded one RF soldier. At 0920 hours on 26 February, elements from D/3-17 Cav detonated a grenade booby trapped on a trail 2 kms west-northwest of Long Thanh (YS120928) resulting in one US soldier killed and three wounded. They swept the area and found one 82mm mortar round which they destroyed. One NVA prisoner-of-war was captured by A/1-27 Inf 3.5 kms southwest of Hung Nghia (YT275066) at 1205 hours on 26 February. One AK47 rifle, 11,800 \$ VN plasters and documents were evacuated. The PW was a member of the Rear Service Section of the 74 NVA Artillery Regiment. The most significant contact of the week occurred at 1350 hours on 27 February when a mechanical ambush set out by C/3-22 Inf 6.5 kms south of Hung Nghia (YT305028) detonated killing six of the enemy. A sweep of the area resulted in the evacuation of three AK47 rifles, one K54 pistol, six rucksacks, 12" US time fuse, five pounds of sugar, five pounds of salt, 40 pounds of rice, five blasting caps, 173 AK47 rounds, one electric lamp, one flashlight, one US hand grenade, six M16 rounds and documents. The documents indicated that the element contacted was from the Rear Service Section, 274 NVA Regt. Papers included weapons lists, personal letters and expenditure lists. One of the enemy KIA's was suspected of being the Adjutant, Headquarters, 274 NVA Regt. A/1-27 Inf killed one enemy 3 kms southwest of Hung Nghia (YT287065) at 1430 hours on 27 February. B/1-27 Inf killed one enemy and captured one AK47 rifle with two full magazines 10 kms north of Hung Nghia (YT292183) at 1738 hours on 27 February. A mechanical ambush set out by D/1-27 Inf 2.5 kms northwest of Hung Nghia (YT282120) detonated at 1915 hours on 28 February resulting in one enemy killed and the evacuation of one AK47 rifle with full magazine, one rucksack with pistol belt, canteen and documents.

The 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division forces killed 76 of the enemy and captured one prisoner-of-war during the month of February, accounted for 64 individual weapons captured in action and 1483 pounds of rice captured.

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a. Personnel

The following personnel occupied key positions in the 2nd Brigade's staff during the reporting period:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>DUTY</u>
Ulatoski, Joseph R.	Col	Brigade CO
Thompson, Harry J. Jr.	ITC	Deputy CO (Administration and Logistics)
Marion, Charles B.	ITC	Deputy CO (Operations)
Finch, James T.	MAJ	S-1
Pattison, John A.	MAJ	S-2
Dilkes, Fred A.	MAJ	S-3
Murray, George T.	MAJ	S-4
Cramer, Ned A.	MAJ	S-5
Moore, Patrick J.	ITC	CO, 1-5 Inf (M)
Johnston, Johnny J.	ITC	CO, 1-27 Inf
Salucci, Ralph	ITC	CO, 2-12 Inf
McCoy, Don S.	ITC	CO, 3-22 Inf
Rickards, Donald A. Jr.	ITC	CO, 3-22 Inf (11-28 Feb)
Hampton, David	ITC	CO, 1-8 Arty
Johnson, Charles R.	ITC	CO, 225th Spt Bn

b. Intelligence

(1) During the month of November, enemy activity throughout the Brigade AO remained generally light. Terrorist activities on the periphery of the AO and reports of food gathering activities in the Hung Loc area indicated that propaganda and proselytizing efforts as well as food procurement had priority over combat activities at that time. Enemy losses were 28 killed, three captured and one rallier received.

(2) During the month of December, enemy activity involving US troops within MR-7 was light. ARVN, RF and PF units were the recipients of most enemy initiated activity in our area of interest. Within the 2nd Brigade's AO, the area south of QL-1 in the Hung Nghia area remained the most active. North of Xuan Loc there was a slight increase in activity. Enemy losses were 42 killed, five captured and five ralliers received.

(3) During the month of January, enemy activity increased as units of the Brigade engaged elements of the 274 NVA Regiment. Most contacts were friendly initiated and involved only small enemy elements. Allied ambushes, including mechanical, were prevalent. Enemy losses were 72 killed, two captured and two ralliers received.

(4) Interrogations, Prisoners-of-War (IPW): During the first two months of the reporting period, the IPW section, 25th MI Co continued its support to the 25th Infantry Division, up until the Division's redeployment in December. The formation of the 25th MI Det, also in December, allowed support of an entire TCS IPW Section to be given to the 2nd Brigade,

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25th Infantry Division. The following statistics depict the operational activities of the IPW Section while OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division and while in support of the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div.

	NOV	DEC	JAN
Knowledgable detainees processed through and exploited by 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div	8	11	10
Interrogations completed	20	33	32
Captured enemy document batches exploited	26	38	51

6. Operations.

(1) Combined operations with Territorial Forces.

(a) A primary mission of the 2nd Brigade was the upgrading of regional and popular forces within the Bde's AO. Combined operations involving a Vietnamese unit, platoon size or greater, with a US element were strongly emphasized; at least three companies of the brigade conducted combined operations daily. US personnel maintained control of the operation while the planning and execution were accomplished jointly. This allowed for the maximum employment of allied fire power. Since 1 November 1970, a total of 764 combined operations were conducted with territorial forces. In both combined and separate operations, territorial forces accounted for 79 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 14 prisoners-of-war, 12 Hoi Chanh and 51 weapons captured in action.

(b) RF/PF Training. The 2nd Brigade maintained an active training program in order to upgrade territorial forces within its AO. During the conduct of combined operations, special emphasis was placed on training. This training included: ambush techniques, mechanical ambush employment, patrolling, artillery and mortar fire adjustment, first aid, and dust-off procedures. In addition to this specialized training, a "dedicated company", B/1-27 Inf, was given the mission of training territorial forces in Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province. From 25 November 1970 through 15 January 1971, they employed an intensive 18 day training program; a total of two RF companies and nine PF platoons were trained during this period. The District Chief coordinated the training program, designating the units to be trained and the specific training program employed for each unit. Thus, the training conducted was specifically tailored for the needs of each unit. The results of this training have upgraded the territorial forces to a higher state of combat readiness. On 16 January 1971, B/1-27 Inf was placed OPCON to the 1st Cav Div (AM) with the mission of training other "dedicated" companies and to continue training territorial forces in Bien Hoa and Long An Provinces.

(2) Artillery operations.

(a) During the reporting period the 1st Battalion, 8th Field Artillery

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continued its direct support mission to the 2nd Brigade (The Fire Brigade) on Operation FCAN THANG IV. In fulfilling its role, "The Automatic Eighth" was headquartered in Xuan Loc and Camp Frenzell-Jones.

(b) Significant tactical moves conducted by the 1-8 Arty commenced on 9 November 1970 when Battery A was airlifted from FSB Hazel to Xuan Loc, and moved by road to Camp Frenzell-Jones. The following day the battery deployed to the Nhon Trach area to support operations of the 1-5 Inf (M); and occupied FSB Stu and FSB Gemini. On 18 November, Battery C moved to FSB Lisa in support of operations of 2-12 Inf. Eighteen days later, it was necessary to split Battery B to support a large airmobile operation of the 3-22 Inf. This operation was completed in seven days at which time the three howitzers returned to FSB Schwartz. On 14 December, Battery C moved to FSB Barbara to support an operation of 2-12 Inf. With the redeployment of the 1st and 3rd Brigades, 25th Infantry Division and the addition of the 1-27 Inf to the 2nd Brigade, it was necessary to add a fourth battery to the battalion. Battery D, previously Battery B, 2-77 Artillery, moved from Cu Chi Base Camp to FSB Beverly on 15 December. On 28 December, Battery A established unit integrity again when it moved to FSB Custer; However, the battery split again on 21 January 1971 and occupied FSB Nance and FSB Stu. The following day, the battery moved to its present location, FSB Rivers. On 24 January, Battery C moved to its present location at FSB Heidi and seven days later Battery D occupied FSB Carol where it remained.

(c) Three attacks were made on fire support bases during the period November through January. On 15 November, Battery A received small arms fire but there were no casualties or damage reported. On 19 November, Battery B received one round of unknown origin and, again, there were no casualties or damage. On 23 November, Battery C received 7-10 mortar rounds which landed outside the berm, causing no casualties or damage.

(d) Ammunition expenditures for the 1-8 Arty during the period November through January totalled 23,942 rounds.

- d. Logistics: None
- e. Communications: None
- f. Materiel: None
- g. Civic Actions:

(1) During the reporting period, 1,466 man-days were used to assist the Vietnamese in civic action projects. During the same time, 1,643,339 \$VN piasters were expended in the form of money or supplies to support the civic action program. A total of 25,500 \$VN piasters was paid in solatium during the period. A total of 148 MEDCAPs was conducted by the 2nd Brigade during the period.

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(2) Psychological Operations.

(a) 652 air broadcast missions were conducted during the period.

(b) 130 hours of air broadcast time was conducted.

(c) 11,833,000 leaflets were dropped in the 2nd Brigade's AO during the period.

(d) 106 hours of ground broadcast time was conducted during the period.

2. (C) LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's observations, evaluations and recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(i) Assignment of LNO and FO personnel.

(a) Observation: By TO&E, artillery liaison officers (LNOs) are assigned to headquarters battery and forward observation (FO) teams to each line battery. In the tactical situation found in Vietnam, FO teams operated at locations quite remote from their battery.

(b) Evaluation: This resulted in burdensome personnel and logistical actions between the battery commander and the FO personnel. Sufficient aircraft were not available for all commanders to pay persons in remote areas, or attend to other administrative requirements. FO members on stand down could seldom return to their unit because of distances involved and the lack of transportation. Decentralized control resulted in some FO members losing identity with parent unit.

(c) Recommendation: That FO personnel be assigned to one battery, under the centralized control of one commander, i.e. headquarters battery.

b. Intelligence. None.

c. Operations.

(i) New personnel on outposts.

(a) Observation: During the reporting period, units had daylight outposts observe enemy personnel at close range but fail to engage them.

(b) Evaluation: The personnel on the outposts invariably gave the reason for not engaging that they thought the observed individuals were friendly Vietnamese forces. Upon closer investigation, it was discovered that the personnel at the outposts were new personnel with very limited experience.

(c) Recommendation: It is essential that at least one individual at all outposts be experienced. This will reduce the occurrences of

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nonengagement of lucrative targets, as well as assisting new personnel in overcoming their initial reluctance to fire their weapons at the enemy. Additionally, it is mandatory that all troops be thoroughly briefed on whether or not to expect friendly military or civilian personnel in their areas of operation.

(2) Enemy use of existent and non-existent (dry) streams.

(a) Observation: The enemy's movement can characteristically be described as being at or near the existing network of streams.

(b) Evaluation: It was discovered that the enemy usually located his base camps along the existing streams because they provided them with a readily available source of water. Additionally, the enemy attempted to locate his base areas in a position on the highest point of ground near the stream so that bunkers will not be inundated during the wet season. Security bunkers, however, were found on both sides of the streams. Good cover and concealment was also prevalent along the streams facilitating enemy movement along trails close to the stream beds. In areas where there were only dry stream beds, the enemy was found to utilize the stream bed itself as opposed to the existing trail network in order to avoid detection.

(c) Recommendation: All units should be aware of this pattern of enemy movement and that the unit's activities in the field be concentrated against these enemy sanctuaries.

(3) Use of night time signal devices.

(a) Observation: Without knowledge before hand of friendly positions, a unit moving on the ground experienced considerable difficulty in ascertaining the precise location of friendly elements.

(b) Evaluation: A unit moving on the ground near a friendly element and without knowledge of the exact location of the friendly position, cannot rely solely on light signals or rifle shots to establish the location of friendlies. Troops at night experience considerable difficulty in judging the distance from a flash of light or rifle shot. Tactically, however, it is not feasible to utilize star clusters or parachute flares, except in the case of enemy contact to signal approaching elements.

(c) Recommendation: That small unit commanders become acutely aware of the exacting requirement to establish accurate grid locations for friendly positions. In cases where the individual is in doubt to the accuracy of his position, he should take all means to include the use of white phosphorous marking rounds to ascertain his exact location. The issuance of small infrared signal devices to the field units, would prove to be a valuable aid to the soldiers on the ground, in spotting friendly positions during his movement.

(4) Friendly approach into suspected enemy bunker complexes.

(a) Observation: When a unit is operating near a suspected enemy bunker

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complex, the commanders cannot rely solely on medium caliber artillery preparations to suitably neutralize the enemy prior to his entry.

(b) Evaluation: In areas of extensive bunker complexes, the use of medium caliber artillery is not sufficient to completely neutralize the enemy position by the destruction of bunkers or enemy booby traps. Destruction of enemy bunker systems can only be assumed through the use of heavy artillery strikes or tactical air strikes. In cases of artillery preparations that are less than totally destructive, the enemy is pre-warned of a possible impending attack or intrusion of his position, and hence additional measures are required.

(c) Recommendation: Prior to the approach into an enemy bunker complex which is additionally suspected to be booby trapped, the unit commander should request all available means to attempt to neutralize the suspected enemy position. In addition, the approaching elements need to be instructed to pre-empt their advance by continuous artillery strikes, i.e., "walking" artillery forward along the route of advance.

(5) Deceptive attacks by the enemy.

(a) Observation: The enemy uses deceptive attacks to escape friendly elements.

(b) Evaluation: When the enemy becomes aware that friendly units are deploying to surround his positions, he will initiate probing attacks to cause friendly units to maneuver to an apparent pocket of resistance. As friendly units maneuver, the enemy will escape around the friendly element.

(c) Recommendation: Units must be alert to continually cover all enemy escape routes, even when maneuvering against a known enemy location.

(6) Enemy utilization of dud US/Allied ammunition.

(a) Observation: The enemy used dud US/Allied ammunition in an indirect fire role during the reporting period against a brigade patrol base.

(b) Evaluation: Three rounds landed near the berm, two outside and one inside, but failed to detonate. A patrol, while checking the area after the blast, found a crater and one satchel charge with CS placed upon a projecting charge in a directional trench. Fill dirt had been used to cushion the satchel charge from the propelling blast. The rounds and the satchel charge were fused in the same manner. Two time fuses with pull release fuse igniters and a time pencil were placed in each of the projectiles. These were initiated by means of trip wires which were stretched tight as the projectiles were propelled toward the target. The propelling charges were double fused with time fuse to allow the enemy party to clear the area prior to detonation.

(c) Recommendation: Units should initiate a program of dud round destruction, when encountered on operations, in order to deny the enemy of a source of indirect fire weapon.

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d. Organization. None.

e. Training

(1) Marksmanship training.

(a) Observation: There was a tendency for personnel to incorporate incorrect marksmanship techniques when engaging enemy targets at close-in ranges, i.e., utilizing automatic fire instead of taking well aimed shots.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel needed to be trained in correct marksmanship procedures, weapons maintenance, and proper zeroing procedures.

(c) Recommendation: Fire support bases should establish field expedient marksmanship ranges and quick-reaction firing ranges, thereby, proper marksmanship can be taught.

(2) Training of Clinical Specialists.

(a) Observation: It has been established that experienced Clinical Specialists are capable of handling all treatment necessary at battalion aid stations thus eliminating the need for surgeons at that level.

(b) Evaluation: Clinical Specialists are arriving in Vietnam directly from their MOS training school without having the practical experience necessary in performing the emergency trauma treatment immediately required of them.

(c) Recommendation: Clinical Specialists should have at least a year of practical experience in a trauma ward prior to arriving in Vietnam.

f. Logistics.

(1) Maintenance supply support.

(a) Observation: Maintenance supply support subjective management during the deactivation of a division by increments causes problems in projecting anticipated needs.

(b) Evaluation: Separate units, such as signal, engineer or cavalry battalions/squadrons, reduced to company size elements, are assigned a new equipment density. Such units must recompute the authorized initial stockage of repair parts. The unit must consider how long it will remain active and decide either to order the complete initial stockage, less repair parts already on hand, or to order only repair parts for which the unit anticipates a high demand. Possession of the complete initial stockage will cover most contingencies. However, it requires greater accounting, more storage space, more time to fill and retrograde. The unit may not exist long enough to follow the prescribed procedure to accumulate demand history to turn-in parts for which insufficient demand exists. Possession of only anticipated high demand repair parts will cover less than most contingencies. However, it requires less accounting, less storage, and less time to fill and retrograde. The unit

may be confident that responsive supply system could provide an unanticipated but urgently required repair part.

(c) Recommendation: Reorganized units, during a time-phased divisional deactivation, project their life expectancy and determine if it is in their own interest to order a complete initial stockage of repair parts or to anticipate demand history and to order selectively only high demand items for stockage.

g. Communications: None.


h. Material: None.

i. Other: None.

3. The period 1 March 1971 to 28 April 1971 will be reported in the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division After Action Report Keystone Robin (Charlie). Addressees listed in distribution below will receive the aforementioned report.

6 Incl

1. Troop List
2. Enemy Strength and Disposition
3. Ltr, Employment of Mechanical Ambushes
4. Ltr, Security of SOI Material
5. Sketch Map
6. Sketch Map


JOSEPH R. ULATOSKI
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - DA, ACSFOR, Washington, D.O. 20301
- 3 - CINSUGARFAC, ATTN: QPOP-DT, APO 96558
- 3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHCS-MH, APO 96375
- 4 - CG, II FFV, ATTN: AC of S, G3, APO 96266
- 2 - CO, 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, ATTN: S3
- 2 - CO, 18th Mil Hist Det

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MACTR-G3PT (16 Mar 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period 1 November 1970 to 28 February 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96266 15 JUN 1971

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CROP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 28 February 1971 from Headquarters, 2d Brigade (Prov) (Sep), 25th Infantry Division.


2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning friendly approach into suspected enemy bunker complexes, page 24, para 2c (4); concur. Because of its greater accuracy, the 8-inch howitzer should be used in preference to the 175mm gun.

b. Reference item concerning training of Clinical Specialists, page 26, para 2e (2); concur. The clinical specialists eventually destined to replace the battalion surgeons have not yet completed their training. An additional year of training is being given in addition to what has been given to the medical technicians (MOS 91C) currently available for the assignment.

c. Reference item concerning "PLL stockage" page 26, para 2f (1); concur. When a unit can accurately predict its life expectancy to be a short period of time, it is impractical to order a stockage of repair parts that will probably never be used and must be turned back in. However, if the unit cannot accurately predict its life expectancy because of the security classification of plans for future redeployment, the unit must form its PLL in accordance with applicable regulations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



KENNETH A. PAYANT
Major, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

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AVHDO-DO (16 Mar 71) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned For The Period]
November 1970 to 28 February 1971

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 25 JUN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 28 February 1971 from Headquarters, 2d Brigade (Prov)(Sep) 25th Infantry Division and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


GEDDES F. MACLAREN
CPT. INF.
Acting Asst Adjutant General

Cy furn:
2/25th Inf Div
TRAC

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GPOP-FD (16 Mar 71) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period 1 November
1970 to 28 February 1971

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 88 JUL 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. Mah

M. L. MAH
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

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TROOP LIST
2d Brigade (Provisional)(Separate)
25th Infantry Division

1 Bn (M), 5th Inf
2 Bn; 12th Inf
3 Bn; 22d Inf
1 Bn, 27th Inf

Brigade Troops:

1 Bn, 8th Arty (105)(DS)
Co F (Ranger), 75th Inf
33th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)
65th Inf Plt (Combat Tracker)
Trp F (Air), 4th Cav (formerly D/3-4
Cav)

Support Units:

HHC, 2d Bde (Prov)(Sep), 25th Inf Div
225th Spt Bn (formerly 25th CSS Bn)
54th Engr Co (formerly 65th Engr Co)
532d Sig Co (formerly 125th Sig Co)
544th MP Plt (formerly 25th MP Plt)
9th Chem Det
18th Mil Hist Det
20th Public Info Det
584th MI Det (formerly 25th MI Det)

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ENEMY STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION

UNIT	STRENGTH	LAST IDENTIFICATION	LOCATION
MR7	540	19 Feb YT848932	Nui Ba area
MR7 RSG	2000	9 Feb YT7491	Nui May Tao area
J85 Trans Bn	430	24 Feb YT302091	Southern MR7
J95 Trans Bn	709	16 Jan YTX89589	Northern MR7
33d NVA Rgt	815		
Hq/Spt Units	205	15 Feb ZT063111	Nui Ong area
1 NVA Inf Bn	220	12 Jan YT802719	Nui Ong area
2 NVA Inf Bn	170	28 Jan YT777289	S Vo Dat area
3 NVA Inf Bn (aka D2 Bn)	195	16 Feb YT517043	NE Xuan Loc
274 MF Inf Rgt	765		
Hq/Spt Units	400	27 Feb YT305028	NW Ong Que Plant
1 Inf Bn	135	17 Feb YT401030	E/Checkerboard Plant
2 Inf Bn	110	15 Feb YT312077	W/Checkerboard Plant
3 Inf Bn	66	14 Feb YS1492	dispersed SE Bich Hoa (P)
74 Arty Rgt	560		
Hq /Spt Units	90	26 Feb YT275066	W/Checkerboard Plant
1 Arty Bn	135	23 Feb YT279147	N/U-1 (P)
2 Arty Bn	165	22 Jan YS254957	Binh Son area
3 Arty Bn	170	24 Feb YT308049	SW Hung Nghia
SR4 Hq	580	31 Jan YS444877	W of Viet Quang
2 VG MF Bn	100	14 Feb YS110938	S Nhon Trach & SR4 Hq
4 VC MF Bn	90	20 Dec 70 YS049928	dispersed NW/Nhon Trach/Thu Duc
8 VC MF Sapper Bn	60	24 Feb YS060923	dispersed Nhon Trach
10 MF Sapper Bn	260	20 Dec 70 YS209799	BSSZ/SE Nhon Trach
Ba Long (P) Hq	475	16 Jan YS5397	W/May Tao
D445 Bn (LF)	150	19 Jan YS710704	Nui Mao Tao area
U-1 (P) Hq	100	18 Feb YT333163	NE Trang Bom
D1 Bn	100	11 Jul 70 YT978187	NE U-1 (P)
D2 Bn	110	19 Jul 69 YT200075	SE U-1 (P)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 2d Brigade (PROV)(SEP)
25th Infantry Division
APO 96268

AVDCSB-C

4 December 1970

SUBJECT: Employment of Mechanical Ambushes (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Purpose. The purpose of this directive is to establish a policy governing the employment of the mechanical ambush (MA).
2. (U) Scope. This directive applies to all units assigned, attached, or under the operational control of the 2d Brigade.
3. (C) Definitions. The following definitions apply:
 - a. Ambush Position (Day/Night). The location of the personnel conducting the ambush.
 - b. Attended Mechanical Ambush (AMA). A mechanical ambush that is located not less than 100m and not more than 500m from the Ambush Position. The word "attended" implies that friendly personnel are able to observe and/or move immediately to the mechanical ambush.
 - c. Unattended mechanical ambush (UMA). A mechanical ambush that is located more than 500m from the Ambush Position and cannot be observed by friendly personnel.
4. (C) Policy.
 - a. General. It is the Brigade Commander's policy that MA's will be fully utilized to assist in the destruction of the enemy. Inherent in this policy is the responsibility of subordinate commanders to impress upon personnel the hazards connected with the MA and the safety precautions required.
 - b. Unattended Mechanical Ambushes. The Brigade Commander retains the authority to approve employment of UMA's. Unattended Mechanical Ambushes will not be employed in populated areas. Request for permission to employ UMA's in unpopulated areas will be submitted to this HQ, ATTN: AVDCSB-C and include the proposed location, duration, provisions for recovery, and a statement to the effect that the UMA has been coordinated with and approved by District and Province.

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4 December 1970

SUBJECT: Employment of Mechanical Ambushes

c. Attended Mechanical Ambushes. Units employing AMA's will adhere to the following measures:

(1) When this device is used in populated areas, it will not be emplaced until after curfew hours and will be detonated in place or removed before the end of curfew.

(2) Commanders will insure that mechanical ambush locations, patterns, and types of triggering mechanisms are precisely recorded and that these records are maintained until the ambush is removed or destroyed.

(3) AMA's should be retrieved within 48 hours of installation. (This duration of emplacement has been judged as the point of diminishing return, i.e. the chances of enemy detection and tampering or removal greatly increases while the probability of producing enemy casualties decreases.) If the AMA is left in place longer than 48 hours, it should be blown in place.

5. (U) Responsibilities.

a. Commanders will insure that the mechanical ambush is only employed by personnel thoroughly trained and knowledgeable of its characteristics, capabilities, safety, and control measures for employment.

b. Commanders will insure that refresher training is conducted monthly for all personnel connected with the use of mechanical ambushes.

c. Commanders are responsible for determining and disseminating the current curfew hours, populated areas, and civilian access areas in their AO.


FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/ DAVID M. NORRIS
t/ DAVID M. NORRIS
Major, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

A

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GERARD J. MONAGHAN
CPT, AGC

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 2d Brigade (Prov) (Sep)
25th Infantry Division
APO 96268

AVBMC

24 December 1970

SUBJECT: Security of SOI Material (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Over the past 30 days, Brigade units have lost a total of two SOI's or SOI extracts (including USKAC Codes) and one Key List. Compromise of security information in each case is probable.
2. (C) The foregoing situation is serious on several counts, but primarily it evidences dereliction of duty by personnel of authority, and it can cost American lives. I am very concerned over the fact that all losses resulted from simple negligence or carelessness.
3. (C) Procedures for handling, transporting, storing, safeguarding, and accounting for this critical material are specified in the 3 series SSI Item. Apparently, this instruction is either not understood or not read. As such, each Commander is directed to institute procedures command-wide whereby the security of SOI or SOI extract data (including USKAC Codes) will be kept in a protective booklet that is securely fastened with both parts of a standard EOCO fastener. Booklets will consist of both front and back covers that are thoroughly reinforced at hinged-joint with cloth or plastic tape. When any booklet starts to deteriorate, it will be replaced. The booklet will be secured to holder's person by a cord around the neck and will be kept in uniform or protective vest breast pocket when not in use. A closed loop will be threaded through at least two holes of SOI extract protective booklet and tied so that loop fits securely around holder's neck. The nylon bootlace is adequate for the job. Identification tag chains are not adequate.
4. (C) SOI material will not be left in rooms, barracks, foot lockers, etc.. Any time this material is not physically on the person to whom it has been issued, it will be properly secured in a locked metal container.

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24 December 1970

SUBJECT: Security of SOI Material (U)

5. (C) No holder of an SOI, or SOI extract (including USKAC Codes), will pass his assigned document to any other individual prior to verifying that the individual is listed on the unit's authorized holder roster.

6. (C) Commanders will maintain current rosters of authorized SOI extract holders. SOI extracts are to be issued to authorized individuals strictly on a tactically essential basis. A hand receipt will be completed and signed by each recipient for all classified material received in the SOI extract. All SOI holders will be cognizant of all provisions of the SSI item 3 series, and this knowledge will be checked regularly by their commanders to insure that the safeguard measures set forth in para 3 and 4 of this letter are being implemented.

7. (C) Individuals transporting SOI material and USKAC Codes will follow the provisions outlined in paragraph 4-3, AR 380-5. The material will be inclosed in two opaque envelopes and contain a receipt for the documents. The inner envelope will be marked with the classification of the material, the outer envelope will be marked "By Safe Hands." A classified document control receipt, DA Form 1203 will be attached to the outer envelope. The material will be carried by the courier in such a manner to preclude loss. A suggested means of transporting SOI material is in a briefcase.


8. (U) The instructions contained herein apply at all levels down to and including, the individual SOI user, even though he may be authorized to hold only one extract page.

9. (U) An inspection team will be formed from the Brigade Headquarters to insure compliance of the instructions contained in this letter.

s/JOSEPH R. ULATOSKI
t/JOSEPH R. ULATOSKI
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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

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GERARD J. MONAGHAN
CPT, AGC

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

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SKETCH MAP 2
EASTERN PORTION OF
2D BDE AO
28 FEB 71
SCALE 1:250,000



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